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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
difficult to reconcile those earlier cases, wherein the Court repeatedly held
the federal judiciary bound by the common law notion of "jury trial,'1 88
with the instant cases, wherein the Court could uncover no historical man-
date from the Framers that unanimity was a necessary element guaranteed
in the Constitution.139 This leaves open the possibility that the requirement
of unanimity in federal jurisdictions could and may yet be changed by an
act of Congress repealing the current statutory provision which codifies the
unanimity rule 140 and providing an appropriate nonunanimity provision.
The Court's decisions in the instant cases rest on somewhat tenuous
ground. Their long range effects cannot at this point be accurately deter-
mined. However, there can be no doubt that the posture of criminal de-
fendants, at least in Louisiana and Oregon, has been adversely affected by
these decisions and that the Court has opened the door to the possibility of
similar risks befalling other defendants in sister states.
Paul Crowley
LABOR LAW - "EMPLOYEE-ORIENTED" COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT IS INSUFFICIENT REASON TO DENY THE ISSUANCE OF A
Boys Markets INJUNCTION.
Avco Corp. v. Local 787, UAW (3d Cir. 1972)
The employer, Avco Corporation (Avco), and Local 787 of the
United Automobile Workers (the "Union"), were parties to a collective
bargaining agreement which contained a "no-strike" clause' as well as a
broad, mandatory arbitration clause.2 Avco laid off 1,500 employees due
138. See notes 15-17 and accompanying text supra.
139. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 409-10 (1972).
140. Currently, jury unanimity is required by federal statute and, therefore, could
no longer be dropped as a federal requirement by a Supreme Court decision unless
the statute itself was declared unconstitutional. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(b). It should be
noted, however, that Justice Powell was of the opinion that the sixth amendment
required unanimity in federal jurisdictions but not in state proceedings. Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 371 (1972) (concurring opinion). The rationale underlying
his position was that the fourteenth amendment did not totally incorporate the first
eight amendments but allowed the states to experiment within the bounds of funda-
mental fairness. Id. at 375-76. The issue of whether the sixth amendment incorporates
unanimity is the single point of departure between Justice Powell and the majority.
Thus, it would be doubtful at the present time whether a majority would hold
unanimity unecessary in federal criminal proceedings, since Justice Powell would
probably shift over to the minority view if a question of federal jury unanimity should
ever come before the Court, creating a five-judge majority for unanimity.
1. The "no-strike" clause provided that there would be no strikes, walkouts, or
other such production stoppages for any reason during the term of the agreement.
Avco Corp. v. Local 787, UAW, 459 F.2d 968, 969 n.3 (3d Cir. 1972), rev'g 325
F. Supp. 588 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
2. The arbitration provision first defined a grievance, then set forth a three-
step grievance procedure. Upon the failure to settle the grievance after the third
step, the Union could refer the dispute to the American Arbitration Association. The
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to a recession in the aerospace industry, but since overtime work was
necessary to maintain proper production flow, Avco continued to request
employees to work overtime.3 Several employees were disciplined by
Avco for refusing the requests. In response to the layoffs and the com-
pany's disciplinary action, the Union passed a resolution stating that all
employees would hence forth refuse all overtime work.4  After the em-
ployees refused subsequent requests, Avco sought a Boys Markets injunc-
tion5 in a state court to enjoin the concerted action, but the Union removed
the case to the federal district court.6 Relying on Stroehmann Brothers
Co. v. Local 427,7 the district court denied the injunctive relief on the
ground that the parties were not "bound to arbitrate the dispute," within
the meaning of Boys Markets,8 since only the Union had the right to
initiate arbitration of the dispute.9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, disapprov-
ing Stroehmann, reversed the district court, holding that an employer may
obtain a Boys Markets injunction enforcing the "no-strike" clause in the
collective bargaining agreement, where the underlying dispute of the strike
is subject to binding arbitration, irrespective of the fact that only the
Union has the right to initiate the arbitration proceedings. The court
presumed the dispute to be arbitrable and declared that upon remand, if
an injunction were appropriate, Avco should be ordered to submit to
arbitration if the Union were to elect that remedy. Avco Corp. v. Local
787, UAW, 459 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1972).
For much of the earlier part of this century, management utilized the
labor injunction'0 and the "willingness" of the federal courts to issue such
injunctions" as the chief means of arresting the development of labor
unions. In response to this federal court "willingness" to aid manage-
ment,12 Congress in 1932, enacted the Norris-LaGuardia Act,13 which,
final decision of the arbitrator on the particular grievance would be binding upon the
parties. Avco Corp. v. Local 787, UAW, 325 F. Supp. 588, 590-91 n.1 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
3. 459 F.2d at 970.
4. Id. The collective bargaining agreement did not mention whether Avco
could require employees to work overtime. Prior to this dispute, three employees
had refused requests to perform overtime work, and Avco eventually disciplined them.
The Union filed a grievance, which led to arbitration. The arbitrator refused to
sustain the disciplinary action because Avco had previously condoned individual
refusals. Id.
5. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970),
noted in 16 VILL. L. REV. 176 (1970). See notes 29-38 and accompanying text infra.
6. 459 F.2d at 970. Removal was pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1970) and
was based on the ground that the action was within the original jurisdiction of the
federal court.
7. 315 F. Supp. 647 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
8. 398 U.S. at 253-54. For a discussion of the specific requirements delineated
by Boys Markets, see notes 35-38 and accompanying text infra.
9. 325 F. Supp. at 591.
10. 398 U.S. at 250. See generally F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR
INJUNCTION 1-133, 200-01 (1930).
11. 398 U.S. at 250. See H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESs 39-41
(1968).
12. Cox, The Role of Law in Labor Disputes, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 592, 594-96
(1954) ; The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1, 200-01 (1970).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 104 et seq. (1970).
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inter alia, barred federal courts from issuing anti-strike injunctions. Under
the protection of that Act, labor organizations began to flourish. Accom-
panying the increasing power of labor unions came a proliferation of labor
strife. In response to this growing problem, Congress shifted its focus
away from the protection of the labor movement toward the encouragement
of the collective bargaining process and the development of a peaceful
means of settling labor disputes. 14 This transformation was embodied in
section 301 (a) of the Taft-Hartley Act,15 which vests jurisdiction in federal
courts to entertain suits by management and unions over violations of
collective bargaining agreements. Problems arose almost immediately
because the congressional reappraisal of the situation was made without
revision of the anti-injunction provision of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 16
Thus, the burden of accommodating section 301 (a) with the prior legisla-
tion was placed upon the judiciary. 17
The first question that confronted the Supreme Court in suits pursuant
to section 301 (a) was which substantive law to apply. In Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills,18 the Court responded to that question and de-
clared the applicable law to be federal law "which the courts must fashion
from the policy of our national labor laws."'19 The policy emanating from
those laws has been based primarily upon the premise that labor peace
may be better maintained through the enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements. 20 Since the peaceful settlement of labor disputes can best be
achieved through arbitration, that process began to emerge as the focal
point of the federal labor policy and was finally enunciated in the Steel-
workers Trilogy. 21 There, the Court "emphasized the importance of
14. 398 U.S. at 251. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970); Note, Labor Relations -
Federal Court Injunctions Against Concerted Strike Activity: Norris-La Guardia
and Taft-Hartley Accomodated, 46 WASH. L. R v. 805, 807 n.14 (1971).
15. Section 301 provides, inter alia:(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined
in this chapter, or between any such labor organization, may be brought in any
district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without
respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of
the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970).
16. Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, frequently referred to as the anti-
injunction provision, provides in part:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out
of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested
in such dispute . . . from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the
following acts:(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any
relation of employment ....
29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
17. 398 U.S. at 251.
18. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
19. Id. at 456.
20. Id. at 455.
21. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). Here the
Supreme Court applied what might be called the presumption of arbitrability. See
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arbitration as an instrument of federal policy for resolving disputes be-
tween labor and management and cautioned the lower courts against
usurping the functions of the arbitrator. '22
Nevertheless, the major problem of accommodating the anti-injunction
provision of the Norris-LaGuardia Act with section 301 (a) of the Taft-
Hartley Act remained unsettled. On its face, section 301(a) appeared
to permit the federal courts to grant any available remedy, including in-
junctions, in suits arising out of violations of collective bargaining agree-
ments. 23 Thus, it appeared that an employer could compel the union to
specifically perform its obligation under the "no-strike" provision of their
contract. However, such an interpretation of the implications of section
301(a) would apparently be irreconcilable with the purpose and intent of
the anti-injunction act. In 1962, the Supreme Court considered this conflict
in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson24 and held that section 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act stood as a bar to the issuance of an anti-strike
injunction by federal courts, in spite of section 301(a). Thus, equitable
enforcement of no-strike clauses was eliminated as a remedy under
that section. 25
Although injunctive relief was not available to the employer in the
federal courts as a result of Sinclair, the remedy was available in the state
courts. This remedy became illusory, however, as a result of the Supreme
Court decision in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735.2O In that case the Court
held that a clause in a collective bargaining agreement was controlled by
federal law and thus, the federal courts had original jurisdiction concur-
rent with the state courts. Therefore, the union could remove the action
from the state court to the appropriate federal district court.2 7
The combined effect of the Supreme Court's decisions in Aero Lodge
and Sinclair was to virtually eliminate suits brought in the state courts
pursuant to section 301(a) to enjoin the breach of a "no-strike" clause in
collective bargaining agreements. Once such a suit was initiated in the
state court, the union would remove to federal court where the desired
remedy was unavailable. 28
Note, Labor Injunctions, Boys Markets, and the Presumption of Arbitrability, 85
HARV. L. REV. 636 (1972).
22. 398 U.S. at 243.
23. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
24. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
25. Id. at 212-16.
26. 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
27. The court found:
It is clear that the claim under this collective bargaining agreement is one
arising under the "laws of the United States" within the meaning of the removal
statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). It likewise seems clear that this suit is within
the "original jurisdiction" of the District Court within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1441(a) and (b).
Id. at 560.
28. Such a situation, i.e., a right without substance, was totally contrary to the
obvious legislative intent of section 301(a). 398 U.S. at 245. Further, it contradicted
the holding of the Court in Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
In that case, the Supreme Court declared that the legislative history of section 301 (a)
made it clear that the state courts were not to be divested of jurisdiction in such
DECEMBER 19721
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The Court reconsidered the controversy created by the Sinclair de-
cision in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770.29 In Boys
Markets, the Court noted that to solve the dilemma created by Aero Lodge
and Sinclair, it could either extend Sinclair to the states or overrule the
holding altogether.8 0 If the Court had extended Sinclair to the states,
there would have been no reasonable means available to the employer to
enforce one of the union's obligations under their labor agreement."'
The Court had previously declared the "no-strike" provision to be the quid
pro quo for the employer's agreement to arbitrate disputes. 32 Since the
reciprocal obligation on the part of the union could not be enforced, the
employer would no longer be apt to agree to the arbitration provision
which would only be specifically enforceable against him. 5 This result
would have been contrary to the federal labor policy. 34 Hence, the Court
overruled Sinclair and held that section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
did not bar federal courts from issuing an injunction enjoining a union
from striking in violation of a "no-strike" clause in the collective bar-
gaining agreement when: (1) the collective bargaining agreement contains
a mandatory, grievance adjustment or arbitration procedure;55 (2) the
strike is over a grievance which both parties were "contractually bound
to arbitrate;"' 0 (3) the employer who seeks the injunction is ordered to
arbitrate as a condition to receiving the injunction ;37 and (4) the injunc-
tion is warranted under ordinary principles of equity. 8
After Boys Markets authorized federal courts to issue injunctions en-
joining strikes under the narrow circumstances delineated by the Court,
suits and, further, that the purpose of the enactment was to expand and supplement
the existing forums available, not eliminate them. Id. at 508-11.
29. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
30. Id. at 247.
31. See note 45 infra. Furthermore, applying Sinclair to the states would divest
state courts of jurisdiction to hear such cases, a situation which would be contrary to
the congressional intent behind section 301(a). See The Supreme Court, 1969 Term,
84 HARV. L. REv. 1, 200-01 (1970).
32. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957).
33. 398 U.S. at 252-53.
34. Id. at 253. The Court determined that Congress did not intend the Norris-
LaGuardia Act to apply to the states and that the "unavailability of equitable relief
in the arbitration context presents a serious impediment to the congressional policy
favoring the voluntary establishment of a mechanism for the peaceful resolution of
labor disputes . . . ." Id. at 247, 253. See McCarroll v. Los Angeles Council of
Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 63, 315 P.2d 322, 332 (1957).
35. 398 U.S. at 253-54.
36. Id.
37. Id. As a condition precedent to the court's granting an injunction enjoining
a strike in violation of the labor contract, the employer should be ordered to submit
to arbitration of the dispute. In cases where only the union may present disputes
for arbitration, the court should order the employer to submit to arbitration if the
union elects the process, but the cou'rt should not order the arbitration of the
dispute. If it were otherwise, the court would be rewriting the collective bargaining
agreement. See 459 F.2d at 972-73.
38. 398 U.S. at 253-54. A determination must be made as to whether the
strike is occurring or will occur; whether it has caused or will cause irreparable
harm to the employer; whether the union will suffer more harm by the issuance
of the injunction than will the employer by its denial; and whether there are other
suitable remedies available. See id. at 254; Comment, The Return of the Strike
Injunction, 51 B.U.L. REv. 665, 682-83 (1971).
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lower courts were left to interpret the meaning of the Boys Markets
holding and its application to particular cases. In Stroehmann Brothers
Co. v. Local 427,39 a district court was faced with the problem of intepret-
ing the reference in Boys Markets that both parties were required to be
"contractually bound to arbitrate the dispute." That court determined that
both parties were not "contractually bound to arbitrate the dispute" because
the arbitration procedure could not be initiated by the employer but only
by the union. 40 Thus, the district court reasoned that where only the union
had the authority to initiate the arbitration procedure, a Boys Markets
injunction could not be issued.41
In the instant case, the arbitration clause contained in the collective
bargaining agreement was similar to that presented to the Strochniann
court.42 The precise question before the Avco court was how to interpret
the "contractually bound to arbitrate" language.43 Logically, at least two
meanings may be posited: (1) the agreement has to provide only for
binding arbitration irrespective of who can and cannot initiate the arbi-
tration process; or (2) both parties must be capable of initiating the
arbitration procedures. The district court, in denying Avco's request for
an injunction, relied upon the Stroehinann interpretation of the critical
language in Boys Markets, and determined that the arbitration procedure
must be capable of being initiated by both parties.44
However, before undertaking an analysis of the Avco court's decision,
it is necessary to review the critical features of the Boys Markets decision
and that Court's rationale. The Boys Markets holding had been narrowly
structured in order to avoid sacrificing the essence of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act 45 - to foster the growth and vitality of labor organizations.4 0 In
striking a balance between that interest and the policy of peaceful resolu-
tion of labor disputes through arbitration, the Boys Markets Court deter-
mined that this latter policy would be seriously eroded if the union's
agreement not to strike were not specifically enforceable. 47 However, the
Court did not open the door to specific performance of any "no-strike"
agreement; it permitted equitable relief to enforce such agreements only
where there was a binding agreement to arbitrate the dispute giving rise
to the strike.48
The policy of peaceful resolution of labor disputes could be satisfac-
torily achieved through arbitration, 49 and the presence of an agreement to
39. 315 F. Supp. 647 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
40. Id. at 651.
41. Id.
42. 459 F.2d at 969-70.
43. Id. at 969.
44. 325 F. Supp. at 591.
45. 398 U.S. at 253.
46. Id. at 252. See 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1970).
47. 398 U.S. at 251-53.
48. Id. at 253-54.
49. Id. at 253.
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arbitrate certain disputes was sufficient justification for the Court to make
the accommodation between that policy and the Norris-LaGuardia Act
and permit specific enforcement of a "no-strike" clause. The union's
promise to refrain from strikes is the quid pro quo for which the employer
agreed to submit to compulsory arbitration.50 By making each party's re-
ciprocal contractual commitments specifically enforceable, the Court merely
provided the employer with a remedial device to enforce the union obli-
gation to submit disputes to arbitration"' rather than to strike.5 2
If the Avco court had adopted the district court's interpretation, the
quid pro quo of the contractual agreement would have been destroyed
since the Union would be perfectly free to strike as long as it did not
initiate arbitration and since the employer would lose the benefit resulting
from its relinquishment of some of its managerial prerogatives. Moreover,
the policy of peaceful resolution of labor disputes would not have been
furthered by the district court interpretation, in spite of the presence of
an arbitration clause, because the employer would have been forced, in
order to break the strike, to resort either to economic sanctions, such as
a layoff or lockout, or to disciplinary action against a select few.
Yet, the arbitration clause in Boys Markets was capable of being
initiated by either party.53 Because of this factor, on careful examination,
the district court's interpretation of the Boys Markets requirement that
both parties be "contractually bound to arbitrate the dispute" was not
totally unreasonable. Since only the Union could initiate the arbitration
procedure, it might be said that the Union agreed to the "no-strike" clause
in return for Avco's relinquishing its right to force the Union to arbitra-
tion. If Avco was permitted to obtain an injunction enjoining a strike
over a dispute which the Union did not desire to arbitrate, Avco would be
indirectly compelling the Union to arbitrate that dispute - a right Avco
did not retain under the contract. 54 If the Union could not strike to force
a settlement of the issue, it would be compelled to initiate the arbitration
procedure to obtain a solution.
The Avco court declared that only the opposite interpretation could
both further the federal labor policy favoring the settlement of disputes
through arbitration and prevent the collective bargaining agreement from
50. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
51. 398 U.S. at 252-53. For other remedies available to an employer in cases
involving a breach of a "no-strike" clause and their adequacy, see ABA PROCEEDINGS -
LABOR RELATIONS LAW: REPORT OF SPECIAL Atkinson-Sinclair COMMITTEE 226, 242(1963); Spelfogel, Enforcement of No-Strike Clause by Injunction, Damage Action
and Discipline, 17 LAB. L.J. 67 (1966); Unkovic, Enforcing the No-Strike Clause,
21 LAB. L.J. 387, 393-96 (1970) ; Note, Employer Remedies for Breach of No-Strike
Clauses, 39 IND. L.J. 387 (1964).
52. In setting out the requirements for this particular relief, the Supreme Court
stated both parties must be "contractually bound to arbitrate the dispute." 398 U.S.
at 253-54.
53. 370 U.S. at 250-53.
54. 459 F.2d at 972.
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becoming illusory. 55 Here there was a strike,5 6 arguably in violation of
the "no-strike" clause over a matter subject to arbitration.5 7 Further, the
Union could have compelled the employer to submit the question to arbi-
tration had it desired to do so.56
Thus, the Avco court adopted a more pragmatic interpretation of the
critical language in Boys Markets and viewed that language as merely
expressing the objective criteria necessary to obtain an injunction. The
requirement that the parties be "contractually bound to arbitrate" was
simply a recognition of the need for binding arbitration to accommodate
the policy interests of section 301(a) and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and
did not mean that each party must be able to initiate the procedure.
Further, in support of this interpretation, the Third Circuit noted that the
arbitration provision in Sinclair was similar to the one in the instant case. 59
Hence, when the majority in Boys Markets overruled Sinclair,60 it adopted
the dissent in Sinclair, thereby implicitly including arbitration agreements
like those in Sinclair and in Avco within its holding.
The Avco decision clarified the basic guidelines that a federal court
should follow when determining whether a Boys Markets injunction6 '
should be issued to prevent a union from striking in violation of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. Although the collective bargaining agreement
must provide for a mandatory, grievance adjustment or arbitration pro-
cedure, consisting of a "no-strike" clause and a provision for the binding
arbitration of disputes arising under the agreement,6 2 it is not necessary
that the arbitration provision provide that both parties be capable of
initiating the procedure. It is only necessary that the union be capable
of doing so, and that both parties be bound by the arbitrator's decision
should the union choose to arbitrate the issue.65 In order to guarantee
the employer the benefit of his bargain under the labor agreement with
the union, the Avco court viewed the clarification or expansion of the
guidelines of Boys Markets as a necessary action. If the decision were
otherwise, the employer would not be receiving the quid pro quo for his
55. Id.
56. Where the collective bargaining agreement does not provide that overtime
work by employees is mandatory, individual refusals to work overtime may not be
called a strike. They certainly cannot be called a strike in violation of a "no-strike"
clause in the labor agreement. However, where the refusal to work overtime is a
concerted action by all employees, that action should be called a strike, especially
where the nature of the employer's production is such that overtime work is a
necessity. Therefore, the Avco court considered the concerted action to refuse
overtime work as a strike in violation of the "no-strike" clause, even though the
collective bargaining agreement was silent on the issue. 459 F.2d at 974. See Elevator
Mfrs. Ass'n v. Elevator Constructors Local 1, 342 F. Supp. 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
First Nat'l Bank v. NLRB, 413 F.2d 921 (8th Cir. 1969); Local P-575, Amalgamated
Meat Cutters, 188 NLRB No. 2 (Jan. 25, 1971).
57. 459 F.2d at 973-74.
58. Id. at 970. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
59. 459 F.2d at 972 n.9.
60. 398 U.S. at 254.
61. See notes 35-38 and accompanying text supra.
62. 398 U.S. at 253-54.
63. 459 F.2d at 972.
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agreement to be bound to arbitration - the "no-strike" obligation - and
the union would still be able to strike.64
Further, in its interpretation of when a Boys Markets injunction
should be issued, the Avco court decided that a presumption of arbitra-
bility should be applied65 when determining whether the dispute is subject
to binding arbitration as required by Boys Markets.66 Therefore, the Avco
court suggested that it would presume the dispute to be arbitrable.67 The
presumption is one of inclusion; that is, it is to be presumed that where
there exists a broad arbitration provision, disputes arising under the con-
tract are subject to that provision. Thus, unless the particular controversy
has been expressly barred from the arbitration process, or strong evidence
has been presented to show that the intent of the parties was to bar the
particular dispute from arbitration, the Third Circuit will presume that
the parties intended the dispute to be resolved through final and bind-
ing arbitration. 68
While the decision in Avco may have clarified the situations in which a
Boys Markets injunction may be issued, it also represents an expansion of
Boys Markets because of the application of the presumption of arbitra-
bility.69 Although one of the main purposes behind the Boys Markets
decision was the furtherance of the federal labor policy favoring arbitra-
tion as the method for the peaceful settlement of labor disputes,70 it cannot
be said, from the decision in Boys Markets, that a presumption of arbitra-
bility was to be applied in determining whether a dispute was one both
parties were bound to arbitrate a. 7  The facts of Boys Markets did not
present that question to the Court.72 Actually, there is language in the
Boys Markets opinion to the effect that the presumption of arbitrability
was not to be applied in such cases.73 However, the facts did bring the
question of the presumption of arbitrability before the instant court.74
64. Id.
65. Id. at 973.
66. 398 U.S. at 254.
67. Id. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 584-85 (1960).
68. 459 F.2d at 973. The Supreme- Court has declared:
In the absence of any express provision excluding the particular grievance
from arbitration, we think only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to
exclude the clause from arbitration can prevail, particularly where . . . the
arbitration clause [is] quite broad.
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 584-85 (1960).
69. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
70. 398 U.S. at 253.
71. See note 73 infra.
72. 398 U.S. at 254.
73. The particular language in Boys Markets is:
When a strike is sought to be enjoined because it is over a grievance which
both parties are contractually bound to arbitrate, the District Court may issue no
injunction order until it first holds that the contract does have that effect . . ..
398 U.S. at 254 (emphasis supplied by the Court). See Note, supra note 21, at
639-40.
74. 459 F.2d at 973.
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The arbitrability question might have been decided by utilizing a form
of res judicata. 75 The Union had previously submitted the question of
overtime work to arbitration, and it had been determined that the issue
was properly subject to the arbitration provision.7 1 Thus, it is arguable
that the Union was estopped from denying the arbitrability of the dispute.
But, in analyzing this issue, the Avco court stated that res judicata would
not bar arbitration of the particular issue at hand.7 7 The prior determina-
tion concerned a refusal of overtime work by only a few employees,
Whereas the present issue concerned a concerted action by all employees. 78
Therefore, the court limited the application of res judicata to specific fact
situations and determined that it should not be made applicable to an ex-
panded spectrum.79 The underlying rationale for the court's limitation may
have been that neither party would reasonably want a binding commitment
of one arbitration decision to be binding on all future factual situations.
Because of the emphasis the court placed on the presumption of arbi-
trability of disputes and the fact that the court so limited the application
of res judicata, it can be said that the Avco court decided that the pre-
sumption of arbitrability should be utilized in the determination of whether
or not the dispute was subject to arbitration."
In cases involving the issuance of a Boys Markets injunction, where
the dispute is arguably outside the arbitration provision, application of the
presumption of arbitrability seemingly deprives the union of one of its
more effective tools to obtain its desired goals, namely, the strike. How-
ever, in situations wherein the dispute is not subject to arbitration, the
union may strike irrespective of the existence of a "no-strike" clause in
the collective bargaining agreement.8' However unfair to the union the
presumption of arbitrability may appear, it does play a vital role in the
furtherance of the peaceful settlement of labor disputes. The union is not
deprived of anything to which it is legally entitled. By presuming disputes
that present even the slightest question of being arbitrable under the con-
tract to be arbitrable in fact, the court merely enforces the legal obligation
which the union freely undertook at the bargaining table. Arbitration
has emerged as the preferred means of settling labor disputes, and a party
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 974.
79. Id.
80. It should be noted that the court's argument for utilizing the presumption
of arbitrability is weakened by the fact that, in support of the presumption, the
court cites a secondary source which is opposed to the utilization of the presumption
of arbitrability in cases dealing with the issuance of Boys Markets injunctions. See
Note, supra note 21.
81. Such a result is implicit in the instant case and in Boys Markets. Since an
injunction may be issued only when the dispute is subject to arbitration, it will
not be issued if the dispute is not so subject. Hence, the union may continue to
strike notwithstanding the existence of a "no-strike" clause.
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